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When does a new individual human life begin? Thinking about 
this question, and the integration of philosophy and science required to 
resolve it, led me to read Nonnan Ford's book, When Did I Begin? 
Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and 
Science. 1 Nestled within Ford's book is a remarkable series of scientific 
statements so potentially fruitfu l in answering the question of the origin 
of human life that I feel compelled to share my reading of them. We 
must follow Ford's insight and prepare a place of understanding by also 
considering the philosophical and historical dimensions of the question 
and its answers. 
Science tells us that the materials for a new being are present as 
the sperm enters the outer membranes of the ovum and that the new 
complex of chromosomes exists twenty to twenty-four hours later at 
syngamy. This concludes fertilization and marks the beginning of the 
zygote.2 There is then cell cleavage under the instruction of the 
mother's messenger RNA. This mRNA was within the ovum prior to 
fertilization. Recent research also tells us that the DNA in one of the 
daughter cells "switches on" when the zygote is between the two to four 
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cell stage.) from this moment forward to death the individual has 
internal self -directed development into an embryo, fetus, newborn baby. 
child, adult, and elderly person. Aristotle's definition of nature as an 
internal principle of activity and rest4 leads to the conclusion that this 
moment of DNA activation is the likely beginning moment of a new 
human being. 
In monozygotic twins, two cells "tum on" with subsequent 
parallel but separate development. The material DNA template is the 
same but the individuals are unique. Twinning remains a challenge to 
the presence of the human soul from the first moments of life because 
it can occur up to seven days after fertilization. This challenge is 
reduced but not eliminated with the scientific information that there is 
short term externally controlled development prior to the enlivening of 
the individua1's's own DNA. 
Human Nature and the Soul 
Aristotle and his great medieval commentator, Thomas 
Aquinas, teach that each natural thing, living or non-living, is a 
substantial unity between matter and fonn. S Within the living, this 
substantial form that is so tightly knit to the body is the soul. The 
Greeks had a broad conception of soul as the principle oflife.6 But in 
the present day, when we say "soul", we usually mean: human soul. 
The human soul is different from the souls of other living beings 
because of its immateriality. William A. Wallace has devoted much 
scholarship to understanding nature and natural being within Thomistic 
tradition. 7 Of the human, he writes, "For the Thomist, man is a 
substantial unity resulting from a union between matter and spirit that 
is the most intimate possible. Man has a soul , which is spiritual...it 
intrinsically informs the body, vitalizes it, renders it capable of 
performing all of its psychic and psycho-somatic functions. ,, 8 
According to Aristotle, nature can be said to be either matter or 
form but it is more properly said of form because it is form that 
determines matter to be of a particular kind. Thus, in the Physics 
nature is defined as "an internal source or cause of being moved and of 
being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and 
not in virtue of a concomitant attribute. " OJ Following this line of 
thought, human nature would include both matter and form , body and 
52 Linacre Quarterly 
soul; but, it is more properly the soul. As substantial Conn the soul is 
the detenninate principle of human existence.
'
(} Thus it is the internal 
energizing rational principle enlivening each human being. 
The human soul is immaterial and, as such, it cannot be 
generated by parents and transmitted to offspring. Thomas Aquinas 
follows Aristotle in requiring a divine origin for the rational soul 
because of the immateriality of human thought. However, Aquinas 
adds that a human soul is created ex nihilo and infused by God fo r each 
human individual . II 
The question we are concerned with is when does this occur? 
When does a human being begin? Currently, there is little di spute that 
there is human biological life by the end of fertilization, often called the 
moment of conception. ' 2 
Fertilization results in a conceptus, also called the zygote. This 
is the single cell that results from the intertwining of chromosomes 
from the ovum and spenn called syngamy. Its DNA, RNA, cytoplasmic 
proteins and organelles are distinct from other organisms and, thus, 
identifiably human.13 Philosophically, coming into existence is 
substantial change. Substantial change is the generation of a new entity 
as opposed to accidental change which is the development, 
augmentation, or diminishment of that which exists. Substantial 
change requires a fonn capable of actuating matter of the appropriate 
kind from within. This would be a substantial fonn . This brings about 
existence and it determines the type of being that is to result from the 
process of change. 14 Understanding substantial change as the moment 
that a new being comes into existence with its own internal principle of 
activity and rest (substantial fonn) call s into question the idea that there 
could be a new living being until there is such an internal power or 
force. If you delay this question you st ill have to ask, is what is 
conceived a human being, an organism with an intellectual soul? The 
conceptus is certainly not able to express such rational activities as 
reason and choice. Yet, the human infant is also not capable of these 
activities. The degree of development required before God would 
infuse a human soul into the growing organism has generated much 
controversy over the centuries of Christian thought. Currently the 
question appears as the issue of immediate or delayed hominization. 
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Immediate Hominization 
Proponents of immediate hominization argue that human 
rational life begins with human biological life. Benedict M. Ashley'~ 
and William E. Mayl6 hold that this is so because there is a continuous 
identity from the nucleus of the zygote to the cortex of the infant. The 
nucleus of the zygote is. then, the primordial organ of rational 
expression. This central organ is responsible for development and 
differentiation. This epigenetic identity allows for no substantial 
change after conception and so hominization must have occurred at the 
moment when fertilization was complete. 
Jerome J. Lejeune17 and Diane N. Irvingl. hold that the 
biologically human tissues of the zygote and embryo must signal the 
presence of the human rational soul from the completion of 
fertilization. syngamy. Irving argues that to accept that there is only a 
vegetative and then a sensitive soul present in the early embryo is to 
destroy the unity of the soul. The products of the self-development of 
the organism, i.e., enzymes, proteins, tissues and organs, are 
scientifically identified as specifically human matter. lfthe soul does 
not contain parts and . 1 would add, if there is an integra1 unity of body 
and soul, then human matter could not be present without a human 
soul. 19 
Similarly. Agneta Sutton20 argues that even though the early 
embryo does not appear to be differentiated, it is the selfsame organism 
that goes on to become differentiated and actually does this itself. 
Thus, "A being possessing abilities associated with rationality must 
always have possessed a nature inherent in which was an original active 
capacity to develop such abilities ... a rational nature."21 This is the third 
century argument of Tertullian of Carthage, "He is a human being 
(homo) who will be one; the whole fruit is actually in the seed.'t22 The 
scientific evidence that we are considering, that the DNA of one cell 
switches on at the two to four cell stage, asks these proponents of 
immediate hominization to reconsider the moment of origin of a new 
human life. One has to ask, could there be a new life before there was 
an active internal principle of development? 
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Monozygotic Twinning and Delayed Hominization 
While hirnselfholding for delayed hominization, Nonnan M. 
Ford admits that 
There are good reasons for believing the same ontological identity 
is retained throughout every stage of growth and development of 
the human person from fertilization. In facl, fertilization is the 
most biologically significant stage in the whole process of the 
transmission of human life. There does not appear to be any other 
comparable discontinuity in the process of reproduction to warrant 
sen ling on any other stage to mark the beginning of the life of an 
individual human being.21 
However, Ford asserts that this continuity is not sufficient. There is not 
necessarily a continuing ontological identity for all zygotes. 
An ontological individual is defined as "a distinct being that is 
not an aggregate of smaller things nor merely a part of a greater 
whole. ,,24 All adults are able to trace a continued existence to their 
origins. That is, from the end it is clear that there was ontological 
identity from the beginning. But, there is not ontological continuity 
from conception to birth. Some zygotes divide into two or more 
embryos which become identical twins or triplets. With Ford2s and 
Wallace26, Joseph F. Donceel21 holds that God would not infuse a 
rational soul until the organism was an irreversibly existent ontological 
individual. The possibility of individual existence being interrupted, as 
evidenced by monozygotic twinning, prevents them from accepting that 
each hwnan person begins at fertilization. It is clear that the zygote and 
early embryo are biologically human and living; what is not clear is 
whether they are irreversibly individual, and this in view of the fact that 
the embryo might divide into two or more embryos with the same set 
of chromosomes (also called the genome). Even though the resulting 
embryos have genetic identity, each has its own human soul and 
develops as an ontologically di stinct individual. 
Ford and Donceel suggest that the zygote develops 
epigenetically from nutritive to sensitive life, and finally to intellectual 
life. The nutritive nature is present at syngamy. This nature then gives 
way to a sensitive nature, which further controls growth and 
development. When the organism has developed to the point where it 
can support human life, God creates and infuses the intellectual soul 
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with its distinctive powers of intellect and will. This soul subsumes the 
nutritive and sensitive powers as now serving the more demanding 
needs of human life. 
Monozygotic twinning can occur until the primitive streak is 
formed at about 14 days after fertilization. Before this time embryonic 
chromosomes remain sufficiently undifferentiated to be totipotent and 
to produce another individual if splitting of the early cells occurs. In 
this way, identical twins provide evidence that biological or genetic 
individuality is not identical with ontological individuality. 
Differentiation and Delayed Hominization 
Proponents of delayed hominization hold that God would not 
infuse a rational soul into materials unable to support a human life. The 
minimum requirement is differentiation, organization, and at least the 
primordium of a central nervous system. For Ford, the early foonation 
of the primitive streak immediately after differentiation meets this 
requirement. Donceel requires, in addition, the foonation of the 
cerebral cortex, which takes place at approximately eight weeks. 
There is historical precedence for delayed hominization in the 
teachings of Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, and Alphonsus Liguori , 
among others, 28 Aquinas held that the organic materials prepared by 
the parents must reach a certain level of development through a 
succession of souls before God would infuse a human soul. It was 
believed that the semen remained with the embryo as a formative power 
until the body was sufficiently developed for God to provide the human 
soul as the principle of self-development. 
The theory of immediate hominization came into vogue after the 
early microscopists of the eighteenth century such as Anton von 
Leeuwenhoek and James Cooke thought they saw fully formed 
miniature humans (homunculi) within the spenn. If such were present, 
then there already was an organized body waiting to be enlivened by 
God and nourished by the maternal womb.29 But, it should be noted 
that current proponents of immediate hominization base their positions 
on Aquinas's requirement for an integral unity between body and soul 
and on the understanding of the generation of new life as substantial 
change. lO They believe that if Thomas had access to the findings of 
modern science he would alter his position and would now support 
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immediate hominization.3l 
The Philosophical Principles of Thomas Aquinas 
Two important Thomistic philosophical principles are identified 
by Heaney and are agreed upon by all of the philosophers we have 
mentioned. The first is that "the human intellectual soul is produced 
immediately by God and not through another agency since, as 
immaterial, it cannot come from a change in matter." It is also agreed 
that "the human soul is infused, that is, produced directly in a body as 
the body's natural perfection.,,)2 Donceel provides another Thomistic 
principle upon which all agree, namely, "the soul is substantial fonn of 
man." This means that the soul is the form of the body. It is nature as 
human, the rational principle of human life. Ironically, it is this very 
principle that calls into question Donceel's view that there is a delay in 
the infusion of the soul. However, Donceel points to yet another 
principle, namely, "a substantial fonn can exist only in matter capable 
of receiving it." A plant soul does not belong in a stone nor an animal 
soul in a plant. This must not be confounded with the animal soul's 
having the powers found in lower natures. "In the case of man's soul 
this means: the human soul can exist only in a highly organized 
body.")) That is, one capable of human inteliectuaJ functions. 
Given the scientific data of his day and the requirement of a 
body being highly organized to receive an intellectual soul it was 
reasonable for Thomas to hold a doctrine of delayed hominization. The 
question before us is whether or not there is now evidence from modem 
science that would encourage Thomas either to retain or to change his 
position. This soWlds simple enough, but each side sees the principles 
of Thomas and modem embryology as supporting its own view. 
Proponents of immediate hominization point to the controlling 
influence of chromosomal DNA, the continuity and organization of the 
conceptus, with its increasing complexity and se lf-determination <tI1d 
self-development through morula, blastula, implantation and 
differentiation to the formation of the primitive streak and finally the 
child, as evidence for the presence of the rational soul from conception 
onward. The controlling Thomistic principle is taken to be that the soul 
is the form of the body and that substantial change has already occurred 
with the first presence of new life. 
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Proponents of delayed hominization point to the totipotentiality 
of cells within the morula, the apparent positional control of cells 
during blastocyst formation. and the potential for twinning until 
differentiation with formation of the primitive streak. The controlling 
principle here is the requirement for the body to have reached a state of 
development commensurate with the kind of soul that informs it. 
Embryonic DNA Activation 
As an alternative to the positions that have been presented, and 
consistent with the pwposes of this article, we need to now consider the 
scientific information presented by Ford that indicates another 
perspective. Ford describes that during early cell cleavage. between the 
2- to 4-cell stage, the DNA of one of the daughter cells "switches on" 
first. Quoting Ford, 
It is well known that maternally derived messenger RNA in the 
cytoplasm of the ovwn controls development of the zygote at least 
up to the two-cell stage, before which lime the embryo's genes have 
not yet been expressed or its genome 'switched-on' genetically.l. 
Ford also writes, 
... the embryonic genome is nol switched on or activated in the 
hwnan before the two-cell stage, and probably not before the four-
cell stage. even though the embryonic genetic programme is 
established at the completion of fertilization ... The hwnan 
individual who is ontologically identical with the future adult could 
hardly be said to exist before the embryonic genome, including the 
paternal genes, is swilched on. (fthe embryo's own genome is not 
activated or expressed, or it is suppressed, no hwnan individual or 
offspring results. )! 
This identification of one cell that is first to be internally 
activated, "switched on", is interesting because in vitro studies of early 
cleavage have shown that the cell that "switches on" first contributes 
more to the inner cell mass of the blastula. Ford writes, 
11 was found that cells divide asynchronously and that the progeny 
of the first blastomere 10 divide at the two-cell stage became more 
advanced and tended to contribute more than its proportionate 
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share 10 the formation of the ICM.)6 
Studies have also shown that the embryo body comes from the inner 
cell mass. After discussing embryological experiments on animals, 
Ford asserts, 
There is good reason 10 apply Ihese conclusions 10 the human 
zygole and the early preimplanled human embryo. This is so 
because the fetus is finally derived from some cells that make up 
the ICM [inner cell massV7 
The remaining iJUler cell mass cells and the other cells that formed the 
blastocyst (trophoblasts) become the membranes and placenta that 
support the intrauterine life of the embryo. 
If further research supports the current data that maternal RNA 
controls cleavage until the chromosomes ofa zygote "switch on", and 
that this cell forms the inner cell mass, and that the fetal body comes 
from this inner cell mass, then, this "switch on" of DNA would be a 
clear indicator of hominization. It would unite the time of substantial 
change and the moment when God infuses the human soul. This 
switching on is at least 30 to 40 hours after the sperm first reaches the 
ovum and may be as long as 50 hours if the chromosome activation 
occurs at 4-cells. Chromosomal DNA in the zygote would be the 
primitive center of control. The maternal mRNA that informed the first 
cell divisions would have a role guiding development of the new 
organism parallel to the role Aquinas previously saw for the sperm. 
This early mRNA control allows for DNA stabilization before the 
reception of a hwnan soul. This diminishes the problem of twiJUling. 
R.G. Edwards reports that 32% of identical or monozygotic 
twins begin at the two-blastomere stage. At this time, the DNA of the 
zygote would not have been activated. However, according to 
Edwards, 68% of identical twinning occurs between three to eight days 
after fertilization.38 This is clearly after the critical point of DNA 
activation. Heredity is one source of twinning. With heredity it can be 
said that the two souls were present from the activation of the DNA. 
Sutton holds that "The incidence of monozygotic twinning, the same in 
all human populations, is a mere 0.36% of live births [I :270], 
indicating that the tendency to twin is genetically determined and 
peculiar to a very small percentage of embryos."39 Another source of 
twins, cited by Ford, is accidents to the iJUler cell mass, as when the 
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blastulocyst is hatching from the zona pellucida just before 
implantation. We become aware of very late accidents when twins 
share some or most of the same body as in Siamese twins. The 
generation of a new human after one of these accidents is small and can 
be accounted for if one were to argue that with an accident that ruptures 
the inner cell mass, God can choose to let the cells be reabsorbed, or He 
can choose to create a new soul. I f this accounted for about 30 to 40 
percent of the cases, and this is an extremely high figure, we would be 
indicating about one occurrence of twinning for every seven or eight 
hundred live births (0.35 of I :270 ~ 771). This suggests that the force 
of the argument from twinning against early hominization will need 
reevaluation if one holds that substantial change and the infusion of the 
human souJ occur at the moment the embryonic DNA switches on and 
established the internal control of new human life.40 
Within this view of hominization at DNA activation, the new 
zygote is vegetative and under the power or information control of the 
materna1 mRNA until it becomes animated. Initial animation is by the 
human intellectual soul. Thus, there is not a succession of souls in the 
way Thomas thought. There is, however, a delayed hominization with 
prolonged parental control, even though it falls to the ovum rather than 
the sperm. This control ceases when the new human becomes self-
developing. This is consistent with the soul being the substantial form 
of the body. It enters into union with the matter of the body at the 
origin of new life (substantial change) when the new set of 
chromosomes is empowered. In thi s scenario the intellectual soul is 
initially expressed as nuclear control of se lf-development. 
Substantial Change 
This discussion will conclude with a brieflook at substance and 
substantial change. We have previously said that a substance is a tmion 
of matter and form. Considered in another way, a natural body can be 
said to be composed of substance and accidents. The initial substance 
is formed from substantial form and primary matter. Accidents are of 
secondary or accidental form and secondary or accidental matter. 
Substance is what the new being is, horse, cat, or human. Substantial 
form and primary matter are united in substantial change to generate the 
new entity. Accidents are the nine categories of being identified by 
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Aristotle that vary with the individual and can be attributed to or 
predicated of substance. These are quantity, quality, relation, place, 
time, position, state, action, or affection.41 
In "Nature and Medical Ethics", Wallace writes, "Thus the SF 
(substantial form) not only informs PM (primary matter) and makes of 
it a complete substance, but it also makes the substance be what it is, 
that is, it organizes and specifies it. Substantial form confers on 
protomatter a stable mode of being, so that the natural substance 
underlies its accidents in more than a transitory fashion."42 Thus 
substantial form, the soul , makes complete, stabilizes, organizes, and 
specifies. The existence of accidents is dependent on the prior 
existence of substance. They are modifications of substance. 
"Matter signed with quantity" was for Thomas thc principle of 
individuation, the origination of a new individual. Within this 
understanding, substantial change is the reception of a form by primary 
matter through the mediation of quantity, which brings a new being into 
existence. Following quantity comes all the other accidents. The 
mediation of quantity or quantitative dispositions is actually the 
Thomistic basis for delayed hominization. As presented above, in this 
view, the incipient embryo does not have sufficient complexity or 
quantitative development to be the recipient of a rational nature; 
moreover, its lack of stability indicates that a stabilizing natural form 
is not yet present.43 The notion of stabilization of the new human being 
by the reception of its substantial form brings us back to the original 
question, when does a new human life begin? We have considered 
three alternatives: stability at fertilization (conception) with no time 
elapsed, transition to stability with DNA activation at less than 50 
hours, and transition to stability with primal streak formation 
(differentiation) at 14 days. 
This article has considered reasons given in support of 
immediate hominization and reasons to accept delayed hominization, 
be that 50 hours or two weeks. Both positions claim Thomas and 
modern science as their source. It has argued for hominization at 
substantial change, the very first moment that there is a new individual 
with an internal principle of activity and rest. The integration of a 
philosophical understanding of nature and substantial change with the 
scientific results in Norman Ford's book, When Did / Begin? , delays 
hominization from conception to the activation of the DNA that 
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controls future development of the new human. One might also say it 
has advanced hominization from primal streak fonnation with the 
awareness that the newly fonned and activated DNA evidences the 
presence of the immaterial intellectual soul. 
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